

July 31, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 9643

a leader who would rather light one candle, than curse the darkness.

President Johnson has asked the Nation—black and white citizen, majority and minority—to light many candles of peace, law and order, friendship, opportunity, and reconciliation.

The riots were condemned as they must be.

The violence was deplored as it must be. No one, said the President, will be rewarded for violence. The President made it clear that only a minority of citizens were involved, and that the majority of the Negro community itself suffered the most from the riots and disturbances.

He made it clear, and I agree with him wholeheartedly, that peace cannot be maintained with the muzzle of a gun.

If civil peace, and law and order do not emerge from the hearts of a people, then that people is in trouble.

In the same vein, if equal rights and equal opportunity do not spring from the inner feelings of a people—and must be guaranteed only by laws—then a society founded on justice and right is also in trouble.

There are already those who call for cutting down urban and domestic opportunity programs—as the President inferred.

There are already those saying we have done too much to help the poor and the minorities.

But we have really not even begun to mount programs sufficient to meet the needs of our people in the 20th century.

Rather than cut back on programs, we must move ahead and fund them with even greater resources.

I know the Nation will respond to the President's call for reconciliation and solutions.

I know that we will not seek scapegoats. Rather, we will seek new means to prevent riots, new roads to cooperation, law and order, opportunity and progress.

I commend the President for his frank and honest appeal to the hearts of his countrymen.

CITY WILL MISS SHERMAN HUNT

(Mr. FULTON of Tennessee (at the request of Mr. MONTGOMERY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, my congressional district and my home city lost a dedicated public servant, and I have lost a valued friend and advisor.

Mr. Sherman M. Hunt, Jr., who was serving his third term as a member of the Metropolitan-Nashville-Davidson County Council, had survived military careers in both World War II and the Korean war, where he served as a special agent with the U.S. Air Force.

He has served as executive officer for the Tennessee Air National Guard until being totally blinded by a gun accident in 1960.

For many persons, faced with the responsibilities of a growing family and who had led an active professional and civil life, such a handicap could have been a shattering experience resulting

in withdrawal from active participation in community life.

But for Mr. Hunt it was a challenge. He was first elected to the council in 1961, and his courage and dedication in not only overcoming his handicap but in surpassing his past accomplishments stand as a tribute to him.

In 1964, when he made an unsuccessful bid as the Democratic candidate for sheriff, Mr. Hunt made a comment which should be studied by every public service when he said:

You can't stand still or you'll fall behind and I like to be part of a progressive movement, moving ahead simultaneously with progress and contributing something.

Those of us who knew him fully realize that his contributions made our city a better place in which to live.

I share with his widow and his three sons a deep sense of personal loss.

The sentiments of a city are expressed in a editorial carried by the Nashville Tennessean, which I submit for inclusion in the RECORD as a memorial to this civic leader:

CITY WILL MISS SHERMAN HUNT

Nashville has lost a valued citizen in the untimely death at 44 of Mr. Sherman M. Hunt Jr., a member of the Metro Council from the eighth district.

A native of the city, Mr. Hunt had outstanding careers as a military officer and as a public official. He was a veteran of World War II and Korea, serving in the later conflict as a special agent for the U.S. Air Force's Office of Special Investigation.

Mr. Hunt served as executive officer of the Tennessee Air National Guard until he was blinded by a gun accident in 1960. Despite the handicap, he was elected to Council the following year. He was serving his third term at the time of his death.

In his service with Council, Mr. Hunt earned a reputation as a well-informed and capable legislator. He was active in his church, Boy Scout work and other civic activities.

The city will miss the presence of such a conscientious public servant who contributed so much of himself to his community.

ISRAEL—A NATION TOO YOUNG TO DIE

(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. MONTGOMERY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, for LOOK magazine, Mr. James A. Michener has written a thoughtful and vivid article on the background of the recent Arab-Israeli war and on the importance now of wiping away the fantasies that still seem to prevent the Arab world from facing up to realities. Mr. Michener's article, entitled "Israel—A Nation Too Young To Die," follows:

ISRAEL—A NATION TOO YOUNG TO DIE

I remember when I first became aware of the unnatural tension under which the citizens of Israel have been obliged to live since the establishment of their nation in 1948. I had come to the seaport city of Haifa to do research on a book, and for well over a year, I stayed there, probing the various libraries at my disposal.

Almost every week, and often three or four times a week, my morning paper carried the

news that one or another leading Arab politician, and not infrequently a head of state of one of the neighboring Arab countries, had announced his intention of leading an army that would "push the Jews of Israel into the sea," or that would "wipe them off the face of the earth," or perhaps, "strangle them forever." I suppose that the threats occurring during the time I worked in Israel totaled well over a hundred.

They came from more than a half-dozen countries, some as far away as Algeria and Morocco, whose preoccupation with Israel I could not understand. They did not come, so far as I remember, from Lebanon or Jordan, which have common boundaries with Israel.

Especially appalling to me were the five different times when some Arab head of state announced that he was going to blow up the city in which I sat working. I took even those threats without panic, for I have seen a good deal of war and bombing and do not frighten easily, but I must admit that when the Arab leaders narrowed down their target to the hotel in which I was sitting, and when on two occasions they gave a specific timetable for dispatching their rockets, I felt shivers run up my spine.

I lived for more than a year under those constant threats. I neutralized them by saying, "I'm free to leave Israel when I like. I have no personal attachments and no responsibility." But what must have been the accumulated anxiety for the head of a growing family in Haifa who heard these threats each week, not for one year but for nineteen? What must have been his feelings if he knew that he could not leave the threatened country, that he had a responsibility both to his family and to his nation?

Israel's apprehension was not a paper one. In addition to the threats, there were constant incursions into Israel, constant shootings across the borders, constant intrusions by groups as large as squadrons or small companies. If I went to do some research on the old synagogue at Korazim, I was somewhat taken aback to find that one day later, a pitched battle had been fought there and two Israeli civilians had been killed. If I went on a picnic to the Sea of Galilee, I was a bit shaken when two days later, there was a bombardment of Israeli boats. If I visited the kibbutz at Dan and waded upstream to the cool spring that forms one of the headwaters of the River Jordan, I was frightened to learn that, shortly before, a man had been lost doing that. And when I moved to Jerusalem, to work in the libraries there, I was sorrowful when children told me I must not walk down this alley by the Persian synagogue; gunfire had been coming in from the rooftops only 50 feet away.

And wherever I went, whether to Haifa, or to Korazim, or the Galilee, or Beersheba, there was the constant dinning in my ears of the threat, reiterated week after week, "We are going to destroy you. We are going to push you into the sea." The history of Israel is the history of ordinary people living ordinary lives under the incessant repetition of that threat, backed up by just enough Arab military activity to prove that the threat might be put into action at any moment.

To understand the problem of Israel, the outsider must imagine himself living in Washington, D.C., and reading each morning that neighbors in Baltimore and Alexandria have again threatened to blow Washington off the face of the earth and to push all Washingtonians into the Potomac. The threat, mind you, does not come from across the Atlantic or Pacific. It comes from a few miles away. And to prove the reality of the threat, actual military adventures occur from time to time, taking the lives of random Washingtonians.

What chance would you say there was for the citizens of Washington to go on indefinitely ignoring such behavior? This article

H 9644

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE

July 31, 1967

is an account of why the citizens of Israel had to react to such a situation.

I must point out at the beginning that I hold no special brief for either the Israelis or Jews in general. I have lived too long among them to retain any starry-eyed visions. They are ordinary people marred by ordinary weaknesses and bolstered by the courage that ordinary men of all nations and races can at times draw upon. I worked among Muslims for ten years before I ever set foot in Israel, and on at least 50 percent of the characteristics by which men and societies are judged, I like Muslims at least as well as I like the Jews.

Furthermore, I am a professional writer who has worked in many contrasting societies, and I have found none inherently superior to all others. There have been many single aspects of Japan, or Polynesia, or Spain, or India, or Afghanistan that I have preferred, and to me, Israel is merely one more country. It happens to have certain characteristics that elicit enormous respect, but so did each of the Muslim countries in which I worked.

What we are concerned with here is a problem of worldwide significance: How can nations that must live side by side do so with a decent regard one for the other? In trying to reach a solution to this problem, Israel has as many responsibilities as its neighbors. However, this particular inquiry relates primarily to certain adjustments the Arabs must make before any kind of stability can be achieved in a region where stability is much to be desired.

Exactly how vicious were the verbal threats? It will be instructive, I think, to follow the behavior of one Arab country over a short period of time so that the non-Middle Easterner can catch something of the quality of the attacks that were constantly being made. For this purpose, I have chosen Syria, which has a common frontier with Israel and an internal political problem that makes verbal attacks on Israel an attractive form of demagoguery.

For some years, Syria's politics have been unusually volatile. During my stay in the area, there were several revolutions, three complete changes of government and continued violence. At one time, observers had hoped that Syria's political union with Egypt might produce a substantial and stable bloc of Arab power that would carry with it a sense of responsibility. But that union did not last long, and with its dissolution, Syria plunged into contortions that carried it first in one direction, then another. Consequently, Syrian politicians found that the one thing that united them was a common call for violence against Israel. This is how they spoke:

13 March 1966, the official newspaper, *Al Baath*: "It has become evident that our problem will only be solved by an armed struggle to expel the rapacious enemy, and put an end to the Zionist presence."

17 April 1966, the chief of state of the country, Nureddin Al-Attassi, in a speech at a military parade: "A total popular war of liberation is the only way to liberate Palestine and foil the plan of imperialism and reaction. . . . We shall work for the mobilization of all efforts for the needs of the total popular war of liberation."

12 May 1966, the Syrian commander in chief: "As for the statements of the so-called ministers and officials in Israel that they will punish states which support the commando forces . . . we tell them that we shall wage a liberation war against them as the Party has decided, and fear and alarm will fill every house in Israel."

19 May 1966, Radio Damascus: "When our revolution declared that the way to liberate Palestine is through a popular war, it knew beforehand that the meaning of this declaration is an open and decisive confrontation with Israel."

22 May 1966, Chief of State Al-Attassi: "We raise the slogan of the people's liberation war. We want total war with no limits, a war that will destroy the Zionist base."

24 May 1966, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad: "We say: We shall never call for, nor accept peace. . . . We have resolved to drench this land with our blood, to oust you, aggressors, and throw you into the sea for good."

16 July 1966, Premier Yousef Zouayen: "The popular liberation war which the Palestinian masses, backed by the Arab masses in the whole Arab homeland, have determined to wage, will foil the methods of Israel and those behind it. We say to Israel: Our reply will be harsh and it will pay dearly."

It must be remembered that the above quotations come from a period of relative stability along the Syrian-Israeli frontier. In the succeeding nine months, from September, 1966, through May, 1967, or just before the outbreak of armed hostilities, both the tempo and the inflammability increased. In those weeks when Syria was not threatening to destroy Israel, the heads of other Arab nations were. During my stay in Israel, I believe all the Arab states, excepting Jordan and Lebanon, made specific announcements that they were preparing a war that would drive Israel into the sea.

This constant incendiary barrage came to a climax in May of 1967, when war against Israel had pretty well been agreed upon, and perhaps that accounts for the exaggerated quality of these statements:

25 May 1967, Cairo radio, in a broadcast to all Arab countries: "The Arab people is firmly resolved to wipe Israel off the map."

26 May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt: "Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

26 May 1967, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Shukaity: "D-day is approaching. The Arabs have waited 19 years for this and will not flinch from the war of liberation."

29 May 1967, the same Mr. Shukaity: "The struggle has begun at the Gulf of Aqaba and will end at the Bay of Acre."

30 May 1967, Cairo radio: "Faced by the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel has two choices, both of which are drenched with Israel's blood. Either it will be strangled by the Arab military and economic siege or it will be killed by the bullets of the Arab armies surrounding it from the South, from the North and from the East."

1 June 1967, the commander of the Egyptian Air Force on Egyptian television: "The Egyptian forces spread from Rafah to Sharm el Sheikh are ready for the order to begin the struggle to which we have looked forward so long."

Now, I suppose that a logical man ought to reason: "If the leaders of the Arab states confine their threats to verbalisms, no matter how virulent, the citizens of Israel should adjust to the situation, for obviously the Arabs are using words in a way that need not be taken seriously." Speaking for myself, after my initial weeks of shock, I began to dismiss the blasts against Israel as bombast.

I tried to quiet my inner fears and become adjusted to this incessant barrage of verbal threats, but my ability to live with them did not mean that I was immune to them. Not at all. For whether I liked it or not, I was living under an act of aggression. That it was psychological rather than physical made it the more insidious. I began to find that, although in public I dismissed the threats as evidences of temporary insanity on the part of those who made them, when I was alone, I had to worry about them. Against my will, I found myself concluding, "If Syria and Egypt and Iraq and the others keep on making such threats, they must in the end do

something about them. And if Israelis continue to hear these threats week after week, they must in the end accept them as real and they, too, will have to act upon them."

In this way, not only were the airwaves polluted, not only was all intercourse between nations contaminated and all chances of peaceful coexistence frustrated, but the psychological processes of both those who made the threats and those who received them, was slowly and painfully corroded until both Arab and Jew knew that war was inevitable. On one visit to Jordan, which was one of the least psychotic areas, I talked with 16 young Arabs, and all said they longed for the day when they could march with the Arab armies into Israel and wipe it off the face of the earth. In Egypt, I found attitudes the same. And what was most regrettable, in Israel, where I knew thousands of persons who would speak frankly, a dull kind of resignation possessed them: "I suppose that one of these days we shall have to defend ourselves again."

It is because of the danger that thrives on verbal threats that English common law evolved the concept of assault and battery. Not many laymen appreciate that in law, the threat to do bodily damage is roughly the same as physically doing it. But society has learned that the continued psychological damage to the threatened victim is often graver than an actual punch in the nose might have been. The threat involves uncertainty and accumulating fear, whereas the physical release of an actual blow is over and done within an instant. Thus in strict legality, if I hold a gun and threaten, "I am going to shoot you," that is an assault. If I actually do the shooting, it is a battery. The important thing, however, is that the law holds the two things roughly equal, and a private citizen may be as quickly thrown in jail for one as for the other.

When assault is resorted to by nations, it is a violation of the United Nations Charter, Article 2, Principle number 4. Yet for 19 years, Israel lived under constant assaults.

In spite of my knowledge that a verbal assault is sometimes more destructive than a physical battery, in spite of my recognition of Arab behavior as aggression, and in spite of my experience with history that proves one aggression breeds another, I still clung to my hope that as long as the Syrians and the Egyptians confined themselves to wordy abuse, Israel could learn to live with it as one of the peculiarities of Arab politics. I even began to understand why nations as far away as Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan wanted to participate in the verbal campaign, for in this way, they kept their franchise as Muslim states. I was pleased to see that more mature Muslim sovereignties like Turkey, Iran and even Arab Tunisia wanted no part of this folly. Again and again, I told my Israeli friends and others who asked me, "As long as the Arabs confine themselves to verbal threats alone, no great damage will be done."

Unfortunately, the surrounding countries did not confine themselves to verbalisms. They also engaged in open acts of invasion, sabotage, terrorism and military action. I myself witnessed the aftermaths of three such actions.

One day in 1963, I visited the ancient black-basalt synagogue at Korazim because I wanted to see how Jews had worshiped in the time of Christ. It is believed that Jesus once lectured there, and I found ruins not often visited by tourists. It was a remote area, peaceful, indifferent, as old almost as the hills. But on the next day, Syrian armed units invaded this rural scene and killed two civilians. Hotheads in Syria boasted that this was part of a planned program of harassment that would continue until all Jews were driven into the sea.

Again in 1963, I visited the Kibbutz Ein Gev for one of its famous fish dinners and a

July 31, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 9645

lazy afternoon of watching boats drifting across the Sea of Galilee. I also climbed up into the hills in back of Ein Gev to see the incredible kibbutz perched on the last half inch of Israeli soil. As I sat in the dining room, whose windows were shielded by a massive concrete bunker, a young Israeli girl explained, "We have to have the wall to keep out the Syrian bullets, for they shoot at us whenever we sit down to eat." Two days after my visit, a Syrian gun emplacement in the hills lobbed shells into the lake, sank a fishing boat and injured five fishermen. Once more, Syria publicly announced that this was part of a continuing campaign.

My most moving experience came when I visited the beautiful Catholic monastery marking the supposed site of Christ's Sermon on the Mount. It rests on the hills west of Capernaum, where Jesus sometimes argued with scholars, and while I was staying there, I learned that shortly before, in Israeli fields to the east, a Syrian patrol had planted land mines and one had exploded, killing two Israeli farmers.

I could go on through the years 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967, citing incident after incident in which acts of actual warfare were perpetrated in this region. From the high hills that Syria occupied to the east, gun positions pumped in random shots at workers on the Israeli farms. From protected emplacements along the shore of the Sea of Galilee, Syrian guns fired point-blank at Israeli fishermen. And night after night, marauding parties crept over the border to mine, to murder and destroy.

Now, no man in his right mind would claim that Israel in the meantime was sitting idly by in childish innocence, or that it accepted these invasions of its sovereignty without striking back. In self-respect, there had to be retaliations, and there were. These war-like Arab acts, backing up verbal threats, would have been suicidal for the Israeli Government to ignore. Arab leaders now began massing enormous armies with much first-rate equipment, and these gave every evidence of being able to crush Israel. What was most provocative of all, the leaders of this might openly announced that they planned to launch a full-scale war. If ever a nation was forewarned by word and act and specific promise of annihilation, it was Israel.

What were the odds against Israel? A quick glance at the figures—46 million in the surrounding Arab countries, 97 million in all, as against 2.6 million Israelis—might lead one to believe that the Arab states would have little trouble in overwhelming Israel, except that twice before, in 1948 and 1956, they had tried to do so and failed. Arab leaders grew adept in explaining away the sadder fact that twice, a handful of Jews had resisted efforts to throw them into the sea. "In 1948," explained the leaders, "we were betrayed by Great Britain, and in 1956, it was the French and English armies that defeated us through their invasion of the Suez." By June, 1967, a persuasive legend had grown up, largely masking the truth that the Arab states had ever tested arms with the Israelis, and completely ignoring that in each war, the Israelis had been victorious. In a magic flood of words, history was repealed.

The Arab leaders created an enticing world of fantasy; one demagogue lived on the pronouncements of the other, and in time, all came to believe that facts were other than they had been. When the Arab armies were able to import huge supplies of modern weapons from their East European supporters, they really believed that their peasant levies, with little stake in their society to fight for, would stand up against Israelis who had good homes, better universities and a deep moral commitment to their nation.

I have had two opportunities to witness the impact of this fantasy world upon rational Arabs. In one of my books, I described

in some detail the manner in which, in 1948, Jewish youths captured the north Israeli city of Safad against overwhelming numbers of Arab soldiers. At no point in my description did I deride the Arabs or cast aspersions upon them. Some dozen correspondents in the different Arab nations commented upon this favorably when they wrote to me complaining about the passage. What they objected to were the facts I presented. Some claimed that the Jews must have numbered 20 or 30 times their known strength. Others argued that Arab units that we know to have been in the city were not really there. Several explained that the loss was due to British perfidy in turning over to the Jews the best military sites, whereas the truth was just the opposite. And all expressed the opinion that I had been tricked by a legend that had not really happened. I had the strange feeling that my correspondents trusted that one morning, they would waken to find that Safad had never really been lost at all, that it was still in Arab hands and that maps and stories to the contrary had been mere propaganda.

Of course, in the preceding paragraph, I am generalizing from a dozen letters, none of whose authors did I see personally, and it may be that I am reading into their letters a greater evidence of fantasy than the writers showed. About my second experience, I cannot make such an error, for it I witnessed in person.

In the summer of 1964, I was vacationing in the lovely city of Alexandria, made famous by the writers of antiquity and by Charles Kingsley and Lawrence Durrell, and one day at sunset, as I was strolling along that unequalled boulevard that runs beside the Mediterranean, I came to a park where in the evenings, a concert of folk music was offered. Now, I am very partial to this form of entertainment, for one learns much from uncontaminated folk songs. So I bought a ticket for the performance.

At the concert, I found a large number of Egyptian families with their children. It was a splendid night, filled with stars and coolness, and we sat back to watch a first-class performance of folk song and dance. The choruses were strong, the dancers agile, and the evening compared with others I had enjoyed in Kyoto, Djakarta, Manila and Mexico City.

A rather large cast performed, and this made me wonder where the money to pay them came from, for the audience was not unusually big, and the prices we had paid were only nominal. I shrugged my shoulders and concluded that this was someone else's problem, but when the regular performance had ended, without a false note that I could detect, the bulges started blowing, excitement gripped the children in the audience, and the curtains parted to show a scene in the year A.D. 2000. In a park much like the one in which we were sitting, a group of children played about the statue of an Egyptian soldier while an old man watched. One of the children asked who the statue was, and by means of a dance, the old fellow explained. Years dropped from his shoulders. His cane became a gun. His ragged clothes fell away to reveal a military uniform, and as more bugles blew, ghosts of his former companions in arms appeared onstage, and in wonderfully choreographed pantomime, the Egyptian Army demonstrated how it had won the great war of 1956.

The scene was at Suez, where a handful of heroic Egyptians held off and finally defeated not an Israeli army but invaders storming ashore from French and English battleships. For each Egyptian soldier, scores of Frenchmen and Englishmen rushed onstage, only to be overwhelmed by sheer courage. In the end, the invaders had to retreat, whereupon the Egyptian defenders fell into a tableau of victory as fine as any I had ever seen. The great powers had been driven off, and Egyptian honor was once more secure.

I looked about me at the audience, and it was apparent that the adults, many of whom must have participated in the events thus portrayed, had begun to accept this version as history. Their eyes glowed, and a real patriotism suffused their faces. As we left the park, I saw one young boy of nine or ten lunging out with an imaginary bayonet to hold off imaginary Frenchmen and Englishmen. When I made inquiries about the performance, I found that it was paid for by the government and was repeated throughout the year.

The whole thing was fantasy, of course, and certainly no worse than similar versions of English history offered in London or French history in Paris. I am sure that parallel perversions could be found in American folklore, and I doubt that much harm is done to children by this patriotic nonsense. But in the case of Egypt and the other Arab lands, there was an additional danger because adults, too, were accepting such fables: college professors, university students, newspaper editors, businessmen believed that Egypt had won a great victory in 1956. I could find no evidence that anyone in public life was willing to admit that in Egypt's military adventure against a handful of Jews, the latter had easily won.

All nations engage in fantasy, but few indulge themselves with so virulent a dream as the twofold Arab dream that Israel does not exist and that the Jews who presently occupy the land of Israel can easily be pushed into the Mediterranean . . . whenever the Arabs finally decide to do so.

Sometime in the spring of 1967, the Arab leaders decided that the time was ripe. Under incessant pressure from Ahmed Shukairy, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who stood to win himself the satrapy of Palestine if he could goad Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia into declaring war on Israel, and with the full connivance of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who stood to win himself an emporship if the war was successful, the Arab nations reached an understanding. These men who had lived so long on fantasy now conceived the supreme fantasy that they could quickly destroy the nation that had twice defeated them and had in the interim grown stronger socially, psychologically and morally, even though its airplanes and tanks had not kept pace in numbers with those of the Arabs.

On May 16, 1967, President Nasser initiated the two final moves. On that day, he elbowed the United Nations Emergency Force out of its peacekeeping positions along the Egyptian-Israeli border in the Sinai Peninsula and forced its ignominiously to retire from the area, thus depriving Israel of the one slim assurance it had that a surprise attack would not be launched from the desert. The fire engine that was supposed to protect the community scuttled out of town at the first smell of smoke. In its place, President Nasser moved up his own divisions, and the stage was set for war.

On May 22, 1967, he made his second crucial move. With the retreat of the United Nations troops, he found himself in sole control of Sharm el Sheik, the fortress commanding the strait leading into the Gulf of Aqaba. It was a simple matter for him to announce that henceforth, the Gulf would be closed to Israeli ships and even to ships of other nations carrying strategic materials bound for Israel. None would be permitted to enter and none to leave. This was a hostile act and had to be construed as a declaration of war. That President Nasser was aware of the gravity of his act, he took no pains to hide: "Sharm el Sheik and the blockade mean real confrontation with Israel. Taking such a step means that we should be ready to enter full-scale war with Israel. It is not an isolated operation."

The Gulf has been recognized as an international waterway because four sovereign

H 9646

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

July 31, 1967

nations line its coast: on the east, Saudi Arabia; on the west, Egypt; on the north, Israel; and on the northeast, Jordan. But it is more important economically to Israel than to any of the other three, since Elath is a major port for handling oil and other heavy cargoes. If the Gulf of Aqaba were to be closed to all shipping, whether to Jordan or Israel, the blockade would damage Jordan, but it would prostrate Israel. However, ships intended for Jordan were allowed to pass, and during the exercise of the blockade, several did proceed unmolested to Jordan. This underlined the fact that the blockade was meant to be an act of war, and lest any misunderstanding the intention. President Nasser proclaimed on May 26:

"The Arab people want to fight. . . . We have been waiting for the suitable day when we shall be completely ready, since if we enter a battle with Israel we should be confident of victory and should take strong measures. We do not speak idly. We have lately felt that our strength is sufficient, and that if we enter the battle with Israel we shall, with God's help, be victorious. Therefore, we have now decided that I take real steps.

"The battle will be a full-scale one, and our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

Obviously, the major maritime nations of the world, having anticipated that such a blockade might one day be attempted, in which case their ship would be powerless to enter the narrow strait, had long been on record regarding two points: (1) the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, and (2) as such, it must be kept open for all nations to use equally without let or hindrance.

By flouting international law and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, President Nasser had effectively and somewhat cleverly cut Israel's lifeline to the south. If the blockade were allowed to continue unchallenged, Israel would experience what its Arab neighbors had been threatening for so long—its strangulation. This was war, but still only an indirect version, in the economic field. One could reasonably hope that from it, President Nasser might back away, but such hopes were dashed on May 28, when he announced over the radio: "We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel."

As the Arabs prepared for what they assured themselves was to be the final conquest of Israel, their morale was at high pitch. And because of what they had been told so continuously over the previous eight years regarding their victory over the British and French in 1956, they believed in all honesty that this time they were going to crush Israel, and fairly easily.

President Nasser encouraged this belief by his belligerent speeches. From Syria, Chief of State Al-Attassi thundered that his army was impatient to begin marching.

The foot soldiers, the aviators, the tank commanders and even the generals prepared to launch what they were convinced would be an easy, victorious sortie. In the fantasy world in which they had lived for so long, and to which they had contributed, words took the place of accomplishment, wishes took the place of military discipline, and inflated dreams of revenge superseded facts.

If the Arabs with their verbal assaults had made life difficult for Israel, they had perpetrated a worse crime against themselves; for they had come to believe their own inflated nonsense.

At the hour of attack, the Voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo issued this stirring call to its soldiers. It is the usual heartening battle cry that all nations use at a time of crisis and in general purpose is not much different from what Englishmen or Russians or Americans would shout to their soldiers, but in the cry for avenging 1948, one hears a unique and powerful force.

"Des-roy, ruin, liberate. Woe to Israel, your hour has arrived. The Arab nation is on its way to render its account. O Israel, this is your end.

"Every Arab must take revenge for 1948, must cross the Armistice lines from all directions and head for Tel Aviv. We shall drive out of existence the shame of Zionism. Rescue the locked Palestine. Hit everywhere till the end.

"There is no room for Israel in Palestine. This is your responsibility, O Arab soldiers! Israel, taste death!"

It required less than 72 hours in June to defeated this bombast.

What can be done to awaken the Arab masses to the reality that Israel stands where it does; and will presumably remain there for some centuries? In the aftermath of 1948, the rest of the world permitted and perhaps encouraged the Arabs to follow a policy of blindly refusing to admit that Israel existed. The armistice commissions, which should have worked out regional policies, were not permitted to operate effectively. Decisions upon which peace depended could not be made because the Arabs refused to acknowledge that history had produced an old-new nation that would prove most viable—that was too young to die. The normal intercourse between nations, such as is conducted between Russia and Germany, which were certainly as bitter enemies as Egypt and Israel, was forbidden, and the region fumbled its way to the war of 1956.

When Israel won handily, the refusal to admit realities persisted, and the same errors were allowed to continue. International commissions did not function, and normal intercourse between nations did not mature, even though the Arab portion of the region and the Israeli form a marvelous, interlocking whole—a unit whose various segments could well profit from economic, medical, educational, developmental and planning cooperation. The blindness and the arrogant folly that produced this stalemate also produced the speeches cited in this article. And they in turn produced the hysteria that led to a third war in less than 20 years.

If the world, in 1948, had insisted that the nations of this area sit down in honest consultation, 1956 might have been avoided. If the world, following the disaster of 1956, had insisted that the Arab nations at least awaken to the existence of Israel, the tremendous folly of 1967 could have been avoided. Now, the world has a third chance, and if some right decisions are made in the months ahead, the even greater of tragedy of 1977 may be avoided. What is necessary is a reasonable revision of boundary lines; a sensible settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem; a cessation of verbal assault and physical battery; and a union of talents and interests, of resources and abilities, so that the region can move forward to a creative society in which all members live infinitely better than anyone there now does.

Am I hopeful that the world will now sensibly tackle its problems when it refused to do so in the aftermath of 1948 and 1956? I am not. President Gamal Abdel Nasser pulled out of the hat one of the cleverest tricks of his career when, in first hours of defeat, he invented the enticing theory that once again it was not Israelis who were crushing his armed might from every direction but English and American aviators. His explanation captivated the imagination of all Arabs, and within a few days was adopted as official dogma. In 1970, when I revisit the lovely waterfront of Alexandria, I expect to see a tableau explaining how, in a moment of travail in the spring of 1967, the Egyptians and their Arab allies stood bravely against the combined air might of Great Britain and the United States and repulsed it. That Israel was involved will not be mentioned.

At the moment when Egyptian armies were suffering their worst defeats, Egypt's undefeated radio was broadcasting the following carefully analyzed situation:

"The United States is the enemy. Its fighters and bombers gathered in large groups to provide for Israel an air umbrella that prevents the Arabs from bombing Israel's towns and villages, while it is moving fast all along the occupied frontiers of the Arabs. The United States, therefore, is the aggressor.

"The United States saw Israel about to collapse under the blow of death. The Chicago gangs moved; the state of gangsterism and bloodshed moved; it moved in order to protect its aggressive base in the Middle East. How vile and treacherous the United States has been in its collusion with the Zionists! It refrained from coming out openly to fight us. It refrained from facing the Arabs with an open and daring hostility. No, Arabs. The United States is too vile and too base to have the ethics of cavaliers. The United States threw, from all its airports and aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, huge and continuous massings of its fighters and bombers in order to provide that air umbrella that protected Israel from the revenge of the Arabs, from the massings of the Arabs, and from the victory of the Arabs.

"The battle is continuing, United States. . . . It is going on until you become, as Britain became after the 1956 collusion, third-rate state. Here we shall bury the American international gangsterism. Here, Arabs, dig graves everywhere; dig them for every U.S. existence; dig them, Arabs. Dig all the homeland a grave for U.S. existence. Dig it, Arabs. Dig it, Arabs. Dig it, Arabs.

"The curse of all the Arabs, from the ocean to the gulf and from every corner of the globe, is on you, America, and on your lackey, Israel; together with the curse of all free peoples, the curse of free men everywhere."

On the night when the defeat of the Arab armies was known to the world as one of the most crushing in history, I discussed matters on an all-night radio show with Dr. M. T. Mehdi, secretary-general of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, and he made these points: "Nothing has changed. Israel is worse than Nazi Germany, and the Arabs will have to drive her from the region. The war will continue precisely as it has been going for the past 19 years. And what the Americans and the English took away from the Arabs by their intervention, the Arabs will recover at the conference table. Peace talks, of course, will have to be conducted through third parties at the United Nations, because no Arab leader will ever agree to sit down and talk with an outlaw nation like Israel. You'll see. The United Nations will force Israel back to her 1948 boundaries, after which all Arab nations will unite in a war to exterminate her, because this is going to be just like the Crusades. For two hundred years, the Arabs will continue their fight and in the end they'll do exactly what they've said. Push Israel into the sea."

Nasser will probably gain more from the Arab world in defeat than he would have gained in victory. The war made him a tragic hero around whom the emotional Arabs can rally. Soon, his new crop of generals will be making the old speeches of 1948, 1956 and 1967. His people will believe them, for fantasy is impossible to eradicate if one's whole society is structured on the perpetuation of the Arabian Nights.

Yet we must dispel that fantasy. To do so is the job to which we are all committed . . . unless we are content to watch this pathetic farce of Arab self-delusion repeated in 1977, 1988 and 1999.

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. MONTGOMERY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GONZALEZ' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

July 31, 1967

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 10447

This first round of hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee will, we believe, contribute measurably to the meeting of these needs. We hope to develop a comprehensive record as to the range of devices which may emit radiation, what is known about the potential health hazards involved, and where increased efforts at surveillance and control are needed. We hope to receive testimony from the manufacturers of the devices involved, from specialists in the field of radiological health, and from governmental officials at all levels involved in matters of radiation control. We invite testimony from interested and concerned parties. It is our hope that these hearings will contribute measurably to the efforts of the Congress to legislate effectively regarding this important and increasingly urgent set of problems.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS ON "COMMITTEE VETO"

Mr. ERVIN, Mr. President, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, I wish to announce that the subcommittee will hold hearings on Wednesday, August 2, at 10 a.m. in room 457, Old Senate Office Building.

The subject of the hearings will be the constitutionality of the "committee veto" provision in the Watershed Protection and Flood Control Act of 1954, as amended, which requires the Department of Agriculture to secure the approval of designated congressional committees before implementing plans for certain watershed and flood control projects.

Witnesses will include Mr. Phillip S. Hughes, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. John C. Bagwell, General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, and Mr. Hollis Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service. Also present to participate in the hearings will be Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER, chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and Representative W. R. POAGE, chairman of the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives.

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF NOMINATION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I desire to announce that today the Senate received the following nomination:

Livingston T. Merchant, of the District of Columbia, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 2 years—reappointment.

In accordance with the committee rule, this pending nomination may not be considered prior to the expiration of 6 days of its receipt in the Senate.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were

ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia:
Release by Army Materiel Command relating to its progress.

By Mr. BYRD of Virginia:
Editorial entitled "Democracy in the U.N.," published in the Richmond Times Dispatch of July 27, 1967.

ELIMINATION OF THE DEFENSE REVOLVING FUND WOULD NOT PREVENT SENDING DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, with respect to the proposed elimination of the Defense Department's revolving fund for insuring military credit sales, the suggestion has been made by some that this action would in turn in some way jeopardize possible military sales to Israel, and therefore the security of that country.

That is not correct, for the following reasons:

First. The amount of military assistance Israel was scheduled to receive in 1968 under this military credit sales authority is very small.

Second. If the decision of the Foreign Relations Committee to abolish the revolving fund becomes law, future credit sales could nevertheless be made to Israel under the authority of section 507 of the Foreign Assistance Act. That section authorizes the President to sell defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, thus avoiding any leadtime for delivery. Payment for such military equipment can be made under terms determined by the President.

Third. The Department of Defense has authority to "grant" military assistance in 1968 in the amount of \$475 million. There is no prohibition whatever on giving assistance to Israel on a grant basis.

Fourth. In case of emergency, the President is authorized under section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act to use up to \$250 million for purposes which are "important to the security of the United States," although there is a limit of \$50 million to any one country.

Fifth. Under section 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President can use up to \$300 million in defense articles from Department of Defense stocks for aiding countries when he deems it "vital to the security of the United States." This latter authority has been used in the past to provide arms to Vietnam. Surely the future of Israel is at least as "vital" to the security of the United States as is the future of South Vietnam.

Sixth. Israel has a sufficiently high international credit rating to guarantee military equipment purchases, either under normal commercial terms, or through regular Export-Import Bank financing. This opportunity would in no way be affected by repeal of the revolving fund.

It should be emphasized that the purpose of the amendment in question is to discourage the Department of Defense from financing sales of sophisticated military hardware to underdeveloped countries which have vast needs for economic development and no legitimate needs for such weapons.

If the security of Israel is again jeopardized by a renewal of rearmament activities in the Middle East, because of the relative importance of that part of the world to the United States—and to our allies in Europe, as well as Japan—as against the importance of the Far East, where this country is now spending in Vietnam alone some \$70 million a day, they should be no question that the necessary military assistance will be forthcoming from the United States and other nations of the free world.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS: STATEMENTS BY SENATORS ERVIN, FULBRIGHT, AND MORSE AT OPENING HEARING

Mr. ERVIN, Mr. President, on Wednesday and Thursday, July 19 and 20, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, of which I am chairman, held its opening hearings. Our primary purpose at those first hearings was to define the scope of the subcommittee's proposed study, and to receive suggestions from our colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives as to particular areas of encroachment by one branch of Government upon another that the subcommittee should investigate in depth during subsequent hearings.

In my opening statement, I emphasized that the subcommittee will attempt a searching and critical evaluation of the present-day significance of the doctrine of separation of powers as a formula for determining the proper role of each of the three coordinate branches of the National Government in our modern complex world. It is not the intention of the subcommittee to attempt to turn back the clock to 1787, nor to deal vaguely with the generalities that inhere in the ideas of federalism and separation of powers. Instead we will recognize that Government in these increasingly trying times is a hard, pragmatic business occupied with specific problems that cannot be resolved by generalizations. We will concern ourselves with the particulars of these problems.

The subcommittee and its staff have compiled a list of subjects that appear to require study and, possibly, remedial legislation. I referred in my statement to four major problem areas that we have selected for early consideration. So that my colleagues may have the benefit of my description of those problems and the examples I cited, I shall ask that the full text of my opening statement be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

In addition to the subjects chosen by the subcommittee for study, many other important and intriguing examples of encroachment by one branch upon another were called to the attention of the subcommittee by Senators and Representatives who appeared at our hearings. So that the Senate may be fully advised of the progress of our study, it is my intention to have some of the statements we received printed in the Record from time to time.

At this time I should like to invite the attention of my colleagues to two especially fine statements on the subject

S10448

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 31, 1967

of the authority of the Congress and the President in the field of foreign policy. These statements were presented to the subcommittee by Senators J. W. FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Senator WAYNE MORSE, a ranking member of that committee. They are among the finest statements on this subject I have heard in many years. I believe the views expressed in them merit the attention of every Member of the Congress and the widest possible dissemination among the American people. Senator FULBRIGHT has asked that his statement be inserted in the Record at the conclusion of his remarks today. I shall ask that the text of Senator MORSE's statement be inserted in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

In his statement, my colleague from Arkansas, Senator FULBRIGHT, speaks of his feeling that constitutional change is in the making. He detects signs in the Congress, particularly in the Senate, of a growing awareness of the loss of congressional power and a growing uneasiness over the extent of executive power. I share that feeling, Mr. President. I sense a growing concern in the Congress and among the American people over the multiplying deviations of our Government from the constitutional principles that have served us so well throughout our national history. I sense a need for a searching constitutional dialog dedicated to discovering a basis for a redefining of the powers and responsibilities of the three branches of the National Government. The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers will provide the forum for such a constitutional dialog. I encourage each of my colleagues in the Senate and the House of Representatives to follow our work carefully and to participate in our studies whenever possible.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statements I have referred to be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM J. ERVIN, JR., BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, JULY 19, 1967

This morning the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers begins three days of hearings—the opening round of a projected series of hearings to be scheduled from time to time throughout both sessions of the 90th Congress. During that period, we will endeavor to accomplish the goal set for us in the resolution establishing the subcommittee; that is, “to make a full and complete study of the separation of powers between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of Government provided by the Constitution, the manner in which power has been exercised by each branch, and the extent, if any, to which any branch or branches of the Government may have encroached upon the powers, functions, and duties vested in any other branch by the Constitution of the United States.”

Our task clearly is a formidable one and one of enormous importance. We shall seek to evaluate the present-day significance of the doctrine of separation of powers as a formula for determining the proper role of each of the three coordinate branches of our Gov-

ernment in our modern, complex world. Additionally, we shall search for legislative proposals, where necessary, to restore the three branches to their proper constitutional roles and to preclude encroachments by one branch upon the powers and functions of another.

The government of the United States that was created in Philadelphia in 1787 took a unique form. It was clearly based on the notion of constitutionalism, the notion that the area of government activity was to be restricted in favor of the liberties of its citizens. But there was no novelty in this; Professor McIlwain has demonstrated the ancient origins of constitutionalism. The original quality imparted to constitutional government by the Philadelphia convention lay in an attempt to assure that government in the United States would remain a government of limited powers by the dispersal of the powers that were granted in the Constitution. Understanding the validity of Lord Acton's dictum long before it was uttered—that power tends to corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely—the founding fathers provided for a permanent division of authority.

That division took two approaches. First, it divided governmental authority between the nation on the one hand and the states on the other. This concept of federalism had never before been ventured in a country with the physical dimensions of this new nation in the New World. Second, it provided for a separation of powers within the three branches of the national government provided for by the first three articles of the Constitution. These provisions for division of authority were not new ideas. The concept that political power and responsibility could be divided among separate and distinct branches of government is as old as Aristotle. Montesquieu and Locke, among the more modern thinkers who contributed to the ideas of the framers, had idealized the concept of the separation of powers as a fundamental principle of political science. But it had remained for the American Constitution to attempt to turn the ideals into practice.

Today, we are beset on all sides by the proposition that the form that the American government has taken is not appropriate to the demands of the modern world. The legitimacy of federalism and the separation of powers has been severely attacked both in word and deed, within the government and outside of it. Certainly there has been a centralization of authority in Washington, and a concomitant decline in the power of the States. Certainly there has been an aggregation of authority in the executive branch of the national government and a comparable weakening of the authority of the legislative branch. Nor has the judiciary been confined to its limited role that was foreseen for it.

In short, all three of our basic concepts, constitutionalism, federalism, and separation of powers, are thought by many to be outmoded means of carrying on affairs in the twentieth century when all governments are “crisis governments” and the great need is for strong central leadership able to make decisions and taken action before the opportunity for constructive action is past. Instead of encouraging such leadership and facilitating the decisionmaking process, the critics say, our system of federalism and separation of powers invites delay, obstruction, obfuscation, and even deadlock.

It must be conceded that the efficiency that is available to monopoly of a plenary governmental power is not available to American government. And it must be expected that this inefficiency, due in no small degree to the separation of powers, is unpopular with those who are eager to use government as an instrument of social change. As Professor Herman Finer has said: “There is no enthusiasm for checks and balances among those who are impatient to create a new social order.”

I have always felt that one of the most salutary features of our Constitution is the degree of inefficiency it imparts to the exercise of governmental power. And I have suspected that the founding fathers intentionally and very wisely provided for a measure of inefficiency to assure that the impulse to act and the opportunity to take action would not occur simultaneously.

But conceding that a degree of inefficiency inheres in a system of government embodying federalism and separation of powers, the question remains whether that inefficiency is not a small price to pay for the individual freedoms that are bought with these constitutional principles. And the question also remains whether the deficiencies in our governmental structure result from the adherence to the notions of federalism and separation of powers or departures from them.

It is the function of this subcommittee to examine the second of these important questions, to discover the present state of the division of governmental authority that was intended to prevent the corruption that absolute power tends to bring in its wake and to recommend appropriate steps for the establishment of appropriate lines of separation of powers. It is not, however, the intention of this subcommittee to attempt to turn back the clock to 1787. Times have changed, and some shifts of authority have inevitably followed such changes. Nor is it the intention of this subcommittee to deal with the generalities that inhere in the ideas of federalism and separation of powers. With the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter, we are cognizant that: “Formulas embodying vague and uncritical generalizations offer tempting opportunities to evade the need for continuous thought.” Government is a pragmatic business occupied with specific problems. Generalizations cannot resolve the particular issues that face our government in increasingly trying times. It is with the particulars of these problems that the subcommittee will be concerned.

The subcommittee and its staff have developed a long list of particulars—some of which I shall make reference to shortly—that we think require scrutiny and, perhaps, legislative action. But we start our task with what we hope is a becoming humility, by inviting the suggestions of others as to the appropriate subjects for our consideration. We begin then with the testimony of some of our colleagues in the Senate and House of Representatives, but our invitation for suggestions goes far beyond the membership of the Congress. We are anxious to receive and consider the ideas of others, in the government and outside of it, scholars and laymen, professionals and businessmen, organizations and individuals. We acknowledge the need for assistance in a task that we regard as one of monumental importance: the preservation of American constitutionalism.

In this regard, the Subcommittee is most fortunate to have the assistance throughout its studies of three consultants who are among the leading scholars in the nation in the fields of constitutional law, political science, and American history. Professor Philip B. Kurland, the subcommittee's chief consultant, who is here this morning, is professor of law at the University of Chicago. He is the editor of *The Supreme Court Review*, the author of numerous books on constitutional law and the Supreme Court, and is without question one of the country's leading authorities on constitutional government. The subcommittee's consultant from the field of political science is Professor Robert G. McCloskey, of the Department of Government, Harvard University. He is the author of a widely known book on the Supreme Court and is an acknowledged authority on American Government. From the field of American history, the subcommittee will have the assistance of Professor William E.